Trention AB (TRENT)

Trention AB is a Sweden-based company that invests in and provides credit to companies. Within credit operations, Trention AB offers various types of financing solutions. In the investment business, the Company invests directly in both listed and unlisted, primarily Swedish small and medium enterprises. Trention AB is listed in Sweden (NASDAQ Stockholm) under the ticker TRENT.

Below I present my key arguments for why each margin of safety criteria is considered to be fulfilled. At the end of the write-up, I also include some “other factors and characteristics” that I consider to be of importance for the idea.

Margin of safety

1) Selling below liquidation value?

  • TRENT is currently trading at a price-to-net-current-asset multiple of 0,71x.
    • Market capitalization = 182M SEK
    • NCAV = 255M SEK
      • The company’s current assets consist mostly of short-term loans and cash.
  • Not included in the NCAV amount stated above is TRENT’s 26,4% ownership in the Swedish publicly-traded company Saxlund Group. At the current share price of Saxlund that position has a market value of 10M SEK. Although this position is stated as a non-current asset, one might argue that it can be considered to be more of a “readily ascertainable asset” nature.

2) Proven business model?

3) Sound financial position?

  • TRENT currently carries 20M SEK of debt on the books. That is a small and financially sound amount considering TRENT’s debt-to-equity ratio of 0,1x.
  • TRENT has a Z-score of 7. That’s well above the cut-off for the indication that financial troubles could lie ahead (i.e. risk of bankruptcy).
  • From an income statement perspective, TRENT has shown that the amount of debt they carry is not an issue (i.e. they have had no problem covering their interest payments).

4) Responsible management?

Other factors and characteristics

  • TRENT is an illiquid, nano-cap market capitalization company (182M SEK = $19M).
  • P/E = 11x.
  • Dividend yield = 3%.
  • TRENT is not only trading at a 52-week low but at an all-time low.
  • TRENT has accumulated 370M SEK of net operating loss carryforwards.

Disclosure: The author is long Trention AB (STO:TRENT)

Support.com Inc (SPRT)

Support.com Inc is a provider of cloud-based software and services for technology support. The Company offers outsourced support services for service providers, retailers, Internet of Things (IoT) solution providers and technology companies. Support.com Inc is listed in the United States (NASDAQ Stock Exchange) under the ticker SPRT.

Below I present my key arguments for why each margin of safety criteria is considered to be fulfilled. At the end of the write-up I also include some “other factors and characteristics” that I consider to be of importance. Hopefully, with this leaner format, compered to previous write-ups, I’m able to speed up my writing process as I take my scribbled down back-of-the-envelope notes into something that’s worth publishing.

Margin of safety

1) Selling below liquidation value?

  • SPRT is currently trading at a price-to-net-current-asset multiple of 0,65x.
    • Market capitalization = $31,7M
    • NCAV = $48,7M
  • The company’s net-current-assets mostly consists of cash and cash equivalents and short-term investments.
    • SPRT has a negative enterprise value.
    • SPRT is selling at a price-to-net-cash multiple of 0,87x.
      • Net cash = $36,5M
  • SPRT has accumulated $143M of net operating loss carryforwards. This amount I consider to be somewhat of a hidden “asset” and something that could become a valuable commodity for the company in the future.

2) Proven business model?

  • As of the latest financial report (Q2 2019), SPRT has posted three consecutive quarters with positive net income.
    • One should note that SPRT has struggled a lot historically (e.g. the company has negative retained earnings of $-211M). However, since activist investors took control of SPRT in 2016 and a new management was put in place things have been moving in the right direction profitability wise. Mainly as a result of heavy cost-cutting.

3) Sound financial position?

  • SPRT has no interest-bearing debt on the balance sheet (i.e. SPRT’s debt-to-equity ratio = 0x).
    • The company has a negligible amount of operating leasing not on the books.
  • The company is profitable and sits on a large pile of cash.

4) Responsible management?

  • Management that has been in place since 2016 seems responsible and shareholder-friendly according to their track record as operators and capital allocators of SPRT. They seem to have a clear plan of execution to turn the company around and/or unlocking the value of trapped assets.

Other factors and characteristics

Disclosure: The author is long Support.com INC (NASDAQ:SPRT)

Signaux Girod SA (GIRO)

Signaux Girod SA specializes in the design, manufacture, marketing, installation, and maintenance of sign equipment. The company has been in business since the 1960s. Signaux Girod SA is listed in France (Euronext Paris) under the ticker GIRO. Note that GIRO file their financial reports in French, so please be aware that there is a risk that I have misunderstood or overlooked something that might be of importance.

Similar to many of the other Liquidation Oxymoron’s that I own, GIRO is a nano-cap company (€13,8M) with shares that are highly illiquid. Unlike some of my other ideas though, GIRO is a family-owned and operated Liquidation Oxymoron that conducts its business in a boring and quite stable industry. When I initiated my position in GIRO at a price of €12,20 the shares were trading at a 52-week low. Not only that, looking back historically one realizes that GIRO has only traded at current price levels and valuation multiples a handful of times. As I will try to demonstrate below, GIRO is a perfect candidate for a diversified portfolio of Liquidation Oxymorons.

Margin of safety

1) Selling below liquidation value?

According to the latest financial report GIRO has an NCAV of €19,9M. In relation to the market cap of €13,8M, GIRO is currently selling at a price-to-NCAV multiple of 0,69x. However, as stated in their latest annual report, GIRO has operating leases of €3,4M. With the operating leases taken into consideration, the price-to-NCAV multiple of 0,84x is a little bit less appetizing. On the other hand, looking at the latest balance sheet we find €29,4M of PP&E. With a net-tangible-asset value of €51,5M, we here have a company that is selling at a price-to-net-tangible-asset multiple of 0,27x. Digging a little bit deeper into the latest financial report one concludes that land and buildings make up for €19M of the total amount of PP&E. Furthermore, the €19M value of land and buildings included in the PP&E value on the balance sheet is an amount that has been highly depreciated. The gross value for land and buildings is stated at an amount of €38M. In sum, although it’s hard to say what the exact liquidation value for GIRO is, looking at the numbers mentioned above I also think it’s hard to not come to the conclusions that GIRO today is selling well below its liquidation value. As Benjamin Graham has famously said;

You don’t need to know a man’s weight to know that he’s fat.

2) Proven business model?

Looking at the historical records one soon comes to the realization that GIRO’s business model is not only a proven one but a quite stable one as well. In the last ten years, GIRO has posted a positive net income in seven of those. Looking at GIRO’s retained earnings of €44M per the last quarterly report further certifies that view. However, last year was one of those three years where the company posted a negative net income. So far this trend has persisted as the last financial report (2018/2019 half-year report) also had negative net income numbers. If one is to believe management though there are some positive indicators for what lies ahead. For example, management state in the last financial report that they expect higher profitability for the second half of the year compared to the same time period last year.

3) Sound financial position?

GIRO currently sits on its smallest debt position in ten years. Per the last financial report, GIRO had €13,7M of debt on the books while they for many years carried an amount of ~€30M of debt. While the trend of a decreasing debt position is a good sign, what is maybe most encouraging is the current debt-to-equity ratio of 0,2. That is a ratio that I in absolute terms determine to be a financially sound one. Furthermore, considering that GIRO for the majority of the last ten years has posted positive net income numbers also suggest that the amount of debt they carry is manageable for them. In other words, GIRO is to be considered financial sound on income statement basis as well. Similar to some of my other ideas though, GIRO’s current Z-score of 2 indicates that financial troubles (i.e. bankruptcy) could lie ahead for the company. However, considering what I have described above, I don’t think the risk of bankruptcy as the Z-score formula suggest is a palpable or even real one in this case.

4) Responsible management?

GIRO has not only been aggressive in paying down their debt position over the last couple of years, management has also made sure that shareholders directly and continuously have gotten a piece of the capital-allocation-pie as well. In the last ten years, GIRO has paid a dividend in eight of those. A small side note to that, in 2018 GIRO paid their shareholders €10M in dividends after the company had sold one of their businesses. The €10M dividend amount is huge considering that GIRO is a €13,8M market cap company (back then the market cap was around €20M). Finally, the company has also been quite aggressive buying back its shares on the open market. In total, GIRO has bought back 7,6% of the total shares outstanding as of current date. There is a buyback program in place and it seems that management is determined to continue with their share buybacks. A side note here is that the shares bought back have not been canceled (i.e. they are held in treasury). In sum, I think it’s pretty clear that GIRO’s management as operators and capital allocators has not only been responsible but quite shareholder-friendly.

Other factors and characteristics

GIRO is owned and operated (e.g. CEO and chairman is Claud Girod) by the Girod family. As of today, the family owns 63% of GIRO.

Disclosure: The author is long Signaux Girod SA (EPA:GIRO)

McCoy Global Inc (MCB)

McCoy Global Inc. is a provider of equipment and technologies used for making up threaded connections in the global oil and gas industry. The Company’s products are used during the well construction phase for land and offshore wells during both oil and gas exploration. The company was incorporated in 1999. McCoy Global Inc. is listed in Canada (Toronto Stock Exchange) under the ticker MCB.

Background

MCB is a company that I have owned previously for reasons similar to the ones that make up the situation today. That is, MCB is selling well below liquidation value although it has good going concern characteristics. Furthermore, MCB is trading at a historically low price (MCB is at a 52-week low and the company has not traded at these levels since 2004). From my perspective, MCB is a clear mean reversion candidate. The position in MCB this time around was bought at an average price of 0,67 CAD. As a result, MCB has been one of the worst performers in the Liquidation Portfolio so far. I say that in combination with the view that nothing has happened that mandate such a decrease in MCB’s share price. As a result, MCB is a potential double down candidate going forward.

Margin of safety

1) Selling below liquidation value?

At the current share price of 0,5 CAD, the company has a market capitalization of 14M CAD. If we put that number in relation to the NCAV of 24M CAD as of the latest quarterly report it should be evident that MCB is selling well below its liquidation value. I say that it should be evident because of the fact that the numbers above translate into a price-to-NCAV multiple of 0,6x. Selling at such a low multiple (one of the lowest ones in the Q2 2019 Liquidation Almanack) there should exist a considerable margin of safety in relation to liquidation value even though about half of the net current asset consists of inventory. What further suggest that the company is selling below its liquidation value is that I have yet to take any of the company’s 11M CAD of PP&E into consideration. That is, with a net tangible asset value of 36M CAD the company currently trades at a price-to-net-tangible-asset-value multiple of 0,4x.

2) Proven business model?

Looking at MCB’s income statement history one soon realizes that this is a company that conducts its business in a cyclical industry.[1] In this case the oil and gas industry. For MCB their success has been and continues to be correlated to the price of oil and gas. For the last ten years, MCB has recorded five years of positive net income and five years of negative net income. In the positive years, MCB has recorded good net income margins in the range of 7-14%. On an accumulated basis though the years of negative net income have exceeded those that have been positive. One will come to a similar conclusion if one takes a look at MCB’s retained earnings (-34M CAD). On the other hand, the accumulated free cash flow over the last ten years is positive. A further positive note is that MCB on a rolling twelve-month basis has a positive net income. Finally, the order intake (17M CAD) and backlog (15,4M CAD) doesn’t look too shabby either as per the last quarter. In sum, although cyclical I think it’s fair to state that MCB has a business model that has been proven to be profitable in good years but also able to survive during the bad ones.

3) Sound financial position?

For a number of years, MCB operated without any debt at all (2016-2013). During the last two years though they have carried an amount of debt in the range of 4-5M CAD on the balance sheet. Looking at the latest quarterly balance sheet the total amount of debt is now 7,7M CAD. That amount translates into a debt-to-equity ratio of 0,2. In other words, the current debt level is by no means at a level that I find alarming. One should also note though that MCB during 2012-2009 had 6-9M CAD of debt on their books.  In other words, the current amount of debt is nothing out of the ordinary for MCB. A positive note in relation to their debt position is the fact that the company currently sits on 9M CAD of cash (cash and cash equivalents makes up about 21 % of the company’s current assets). Together with what I have stated above regarding MCB’s business model, I find it unlikely that MCB will struggle to pay any of their interest payments or that they will struggle to pay or refinance the 2,3M CAD portion of their debt that is short term. However, one should know though that looking at MCB’s Z-score of 1,3 tells another story. A Z-score of 1,3 indicates “distressed” if one is to interpret what the number tells you according to the original formula. As I have just tried to layout though, I think that is not the case here. On that note, MCB has had similar Z-scores during most years looking back historically.

4) Responsible management?

Apart from the valuation, what I find most intriguing about the MCB idea is related to management and how they have approached things historically. Both as operators, capital allocators, and financiers. First of all, navigating and surviving the harsh cyclical business environment that MCB operates in tells us that management is at least somewhat competent. Also, I have found nothing that indicates that management would be fraudulent or shareholder unfriendly. Quite the contrary.

During the last ten years, MCB has paid a dividend to shareholders in six of those. MCB has also bought back shares (worth 0,39M CAD) during the last two years. However, looking at the last ten year period they have been net issuers of their own shares. The total dilution though has been minor and most of the share issuance was done during 2013-2014 when the company was trading well above book value. One should also note that the total amount of dividends paid over the last ten years (21,9M CAD) well exceeded those amounts that the company raised from share issuance over the same time period (2,92M CAD). Also, one should know that there is a share repurchase plan currently in place (active until 4 June 2020) for 5% of the shares outstanding. This share repurchase plan is an extension of the one that lasted until 4 June 2019. Although the total amount that they have bought back is nothing to be excited about (0,39M CAD), MCB has used their share repurchase plans for seven consecutive quarters in a row now. This buyback consistency in combination with the way management has argued for the validity of this plan I do like though:

McCoy’s management and Board of Directors believe that the current market price of its common shares does not represent the underlying value of the Company, and has determined that the repurchase of its common shares is a desirable use of funds and in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders.

Other factors and characteristics

Although MCB is a nano-cap company the company might not be as overlooked as some of the previous ideas mentioned in the Q2 2019 Liquidation Alamanck. There are both institutions invested in MCB and there are even analysts who cover the company. On the other hand, the trading of MCB’s shares is still somewhat illiquid.

Insiders own about 3% of the shares outstanding. The CEO James W. Rakievich alone owns 2,08 %. Although insider ownership is a bit less than what I like, the compensation of insiders is at least reasonable in relation to this amount of ownership. On that note, one should also be aware that there are about 1,4M options outstanding but all are out of the money by a wide margin as of the current date.

Disclosure: The author is long McCoy Global Inc (TSE:MCB)

 

[1] I would like to stress that high cyclicality will be a common theme for the ideas that I present in the Liquidation Almanack going forward. Cyclicality is often the very reason why companies are pushed down to a price that is so low that one can come to the conclusion that it’s selling below its liquidation value. On the other hand, the cyclical nature of these businesses also creates the foundation for a strong mean reversion candidate. The important thing is to sort out those companies that can survive the downturn so they can enjoy the fruit that comes with the upswing of the cycle. One part of such evaluation is the historical track record of a company’s business model (i.e. historical profitability).

Continental Materials Corp (CUO)

Continental Materials Corp based in Chicago, Illinois, was founded in 1954. The parent company owns six manufacturing companies in the building and industrial products markets in North America. The companies operate primarily in two industry groups; Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) and Construction Products. Continental Materials Corp is listed in the United States (American Stock Exchange) under the ticker CUO.

Background

CUO was one of my latest additions to the Liquidation Oxymoron’s portfolio for Q2 2019. The position was purchased at an average price of $15,25. Compared to many of the other ideas in the Q2 Liquidation Almanack, the pitch for CUO is a bit less straightforward. Still, I would argue that CUO is one of my most interesting positions because of the multiple catalysts in play and several favorable factors and characteristics that go along with the idea.

Margin of safety

1) Selling below liquidation value?

Looking at the latest financial report, it’s perfectly obvious that the CUO has a liquidation value that well exceeds the current market cap of $26M. For example, the company’s net-current-asset-value (NCAV) equals $43M. However, because of events that took place since the Q1 report that view is more debatable as of current date.

Here is the deal. During 2019 CUO got a favorable outcome from a legal situation which resulted in a settlement agreement of $15M. On top of that, the company recently sold one of their wholly-owned businesses for $27M. In total, that $42M would equal $25 per share in cash alone. As a result, per the last quarterly report, CUO had an NCAV of $43M with about half of the current assets in cash and cash equivalents. In relation to the market cap of $26M, we would here be talking about a company that is selling at a 0,6x multiple in relation to NCAV. However, what is not reflected in the last quarterly report and the numbers mentioned above is the fact that CUO made three acquisitions during May and June 2019. In other words, a large portion of the cash as stated on the latest balance sheet is most likely gone when the next quarterly report is published. How much is as of current date unknown as they have only released a few details about the transactions made. There is one exception. One of the three transactions was In-O-Vate Technologies, Inc. which CUO acquired in June for $12,3M.

Although the amount of cash will be lower in the next quarterly report and we, therefore, don’t know the liquidation value as of current date, I still think it’s reasonable to assume that CUO is selling well below its liquidation value as of today. I base that belief on a three-part argument that: 1) the businesses that CUO did not sell are profitable and should be worth something as they managed to sell the one that was not profitable for $27M. 2) The businesses that they have acquired should also be profitable assuming that they have followed their stated acquisition profile (more about that below when I discuss the second margin of safety criteria). In other words, the value of the $42M in cash should at least somewhat be carried over going forward. And finally, 3) apart from what I have already mentioned as it relates to the NCAV it should be noted that there is $15M of PP&E that already sits on CUOs books. Arguably that amount adds to the margin of safety of CUOs liquidation value as of today. That is, the company currently has a net tangible asset value of $62M which currently translates into a price-to-net-tangible-asset-value multiple of 0,4x.

2) Proven business model?

Looking at the earnings record for CUO one realizes that the company has both struggled and prospered historically. For the last ten years, CUO has reported more years (six) with negative net income numbers than positive. However, stepping beyond the last ten years by looking at the company’s retained earnings one gets a more favorable impression of CUOs business model. Retained earnings amount to $74M at the end of Q1 2019. On a similarly positive note, the accumulated amount of free cash flow over the last ten years is positive. The difference between earnings and free cash flow has to do with the fact that CUO made two quite major write-offs related to investments in the mining industry during the last ten years. Although what I have just stated is important to note, the previously mentioned changes in the company’s corporate structure make this information less valuable when one is to evaluate the whether CUO has a proven business model or not. Furthermore, because we know so little about the businesses that were acquired we are dealing with a few unknowns as it relates to that evaluation.

Here is what we do know though that leads me to believe that CUO has a proven business model going forward as well. First of all, the businesses that were not sold off were profitable per last quarter and what was sold was unprofitable. Secondly, going forward they are focusing on acquiring family-owned manufacturing companies and thereby moving away from their historical bad investments in the mining industry. Also, although we know little about the companies acquired (American Wheatley and Global Flow Products – price unknown, In-O-Vate Technologies Inc – price $12,3M, and Serenity Sliding Door Systems and Fastrac Building Supply – price unknown) we do know something about the CUOs acquisition profile that led to these specific acquisitions. Specifically, CUOs acquisition profile state that CUO is looking for companies with “Profitability – 5% operating margin minimum” but also companies with “Risk profile – Stable returns”. Although I don’t know for sure, I give CUOs management the benefit of the doubt here and believe that the businesses they have acquired follow their stated profile. In sum, on a consolidated basis, I believe CUO should be profitable going forward and therefore to be considered to have a proven business model.

3) Sound financial position?

CUO had $0,8M of debt on the books per the last quarterly report. One should here note that ten years ago the amount of debt was $13M. With such a small portion of debt together with what I have just stated about the company’s profitability history, it should come as no surprise that CUOs current Z-score amount to 4,2. In other words, a Z-score that is well above the cut-off for what could otherwise be an indication that troubles lie ahead (i.e. risk of bankruptcy). The only question one has to think about as it relates to this margin of safety criteria is; will CUOs levels of debt change as a result of the recent acquisitions? My answer is, I don’t’ have any reason to believe that a major increase in debt will be seen going forward given the amount of cash at hand when CUO made these acquisitions. At least, not an increase that would jeopardize or change my current view about CUOs financial position.

4) Responsible management?

I think there are a few positive things to say about CUOs management from a capital allocation perspective although they have made some mistakes historically (e.g. the investment in the mining industry as discussed previously). Looking at the last ten years CUO have been net buyers of their own shares. Going forward that seems to be the case as well given the fact that a stock repurchase plan for $1M is in place for the next 36 months (starting 6 of March 2019). The $1M might first seem like an insignificant amount for a $26M company. In absolute terms that is true. However, given the fact that CUOs free-float consists of only 397K shares (there are 1,72M shares outstanding in total), that is not so. In numerical terms, at the current share price of $15,25 the $1M share buyback plan would equal about 17% of CUOs free-float. 

The low liquidity is related to one of the main reasons why I have confidence in the responsibility of CUOs management. That is, the CUO is both founded and majority-owned by the Gidwitz family. Insiders together own 73% of the shares outstanding. Management has arguably considerable skin-in-the-game both financially and emotionally which should at least somewhat align them with outside shareholders. On a negative note though, one should note that CUO has never paid a dividend to its shareholders (not during the last ten years at least). In sum, my view is that CUOs management is neither fraudulent nor shareholder unfriendly.

Other factors and characteristics

Using some of the information from CUOs acquisition profile mentioned previously we can make an educated guess about the added profitability from the three acquisitions they have made. CUO state in their acquisition profile that “Size – from $10m to $100m in Revenue” is one of their target criteria. Using their stated “Profitability – 5% operating margin minimum” criteria on top of that we can calculate potential amounts of added profitability:

  1. Assuming an average revenue of $10M for each of the three acquisition would result in an increase of $1,5M in operating income for CUO.
  2. Assuming an average revenue of $50M for each of the three acquisition would result in an increase of $7,5M in operating income for CUO.
  3. Assuming an average revenue of $100M for each of the three acquisition would result in an increase of $15M in operating income for CUO.

If any of these amounts turn out to be anywhere close to reality we are here talking about a considerable increase in CUOs overall profitability. I would argue that given the company’s current market capitalization of $26M the market as of current date gives no or little credit for any of these alternatives to be true. This could potentially be a catalyst when the next financial reports are published. For example, using the second alternative of $7,5M in operating income would imply a price-to-operating-income multiple of 3x for CUO (without taking into account any of CUOs current profitability) as of today.

Disclosure: The author is long Continental Materials Corp (NYSE:CUO)

IndigoVision Group PLC (IND)

IndigoVision Group plc is a United Kingdom-based company engaged in the design, development, manufacture, and sale of networked video security systems. The company was incorporated in 2000. IndigoVision Group plc is listed in London (AIM stock exchange) under the ticker IND. Note that the company is traded in GBX but the company uses USD as their reporting currency.

Background

IND has been in the Liquidation Oxymoron’s portfolio since February 2018 when I entered the position at an average price of 118 GBX. As I write this the shares are currently trading at a price of 174 GBX. The price of IND has increased quite a bit and as a result, my first margin of safety criteria (i.e. selling below liquidation value) is no longer fulfilled as of today. Since the follow-up date for my evaluation to hold or sell my IND position is a few months away (February 2020) that conclusion might change though. This depends on the share price development as well as the development of the company’s liquidation value until the follow-up date. If my reasoning here is unclear I recommend that you read part III of my Investment Manifesto where I explain my holding- and selling process.

Margin of safety

1) Selling below liquidation value?

IND is an illiquid nano-cap stock with a current market cap of $16,4M (13M GBP). The shares are currently trading at a price-to-NCAV multiple (operating leases included) of 1,3x. When I entered IND back in February 2018 the same multiple was 0,75x. The change in margin of safety in relation to liquidation value has mainly been a result of an increased share price but also a negative burn-rate for the company’s liquidation value. As of today, I would not make the claim that IND is selling below its liquidation value. In relation to that claim, I would argue that the company has no other readily ascertainable assets on the books to take into consideration for the calculation of liquidation value. Also, based on my analysis I have no reason to believe that there are hidden assets not reflected on the company’s balance sheet that should be taken into consideration for the calculation of INDs liquidation value.

2) Proven business model?

The last four years have been hard for IND. Although they have managed to put out quarterly reports with positive net earnings during that time they have on a full-year basis recorded losses. However, before 2015 the company recorded positive net earnings six years in a row with net profit margins in the range of 5-9%. Looking at the company’s retained earnings of $15M solidifies that IND, although recently struggling, have a proven business model. Furthermore, in relation to what I have just said it should be noted that management in a trading update from 16 May 2019 stated that indicators support a return to profitability for the company in the current year. Also, in a more recent trading update from 11 July 2019 IND stated that for H1 2019 a return to profitability for the first half of the calendar year is to be expected. That is good news indeed as achieving H1 profitability would be the first time they do so since 2014.

3) Sound financial position?

There is not much to say when it comes to the assessment of the soundness of the company’s financial position. IND has almost no debt on its balance sheet ($0,01M). As a result, debt-to-equity, that is one of my main ratios to look at when it comes to the assessment of this criteria is as good as it gets (i.e. 0x). Another key ratio is the Altman Z-score which is currently at 3,6 for IND. That number is well above the cutoff that could otherwise indicate that financial troubles lie ahead (i.e. risk of bankruptcy).

4) Responsible management?

During the last ten years, the company has paid shareholders a dividend in eight of those. The last and first of those ten years were the ones when the company didn’t pay a dividend. IND has also historically made some minor share repurchases but also issued some shares (stock options related). In total though the company has over the last ten years been net buyers of their own shares (i.e. bought back more than what they have issued). The shares bought back have not been canceled and as a result IND has currently 97,238 shares in treasury as of 31 December 2018. In sum, since I have not found anything that indicates fraud together with what I have described above I think it’s fair to state that IND has responsible management.

Other factors and characteristics

IND is a clear mean-reversion candidate. Both in terms of its level of profitability and the valuation multiples that the company is valued at by the market. IND has only during short time periods historically fit the Liquidation Oxymoron description (i.e. the company has historically trade well above its liquidation value). If the company can manage to get back to profitability, as seems to be the case based on recent trading updates, the valuation multiples and the share price will naturally trend upwards. Furthermore, with a return to profitability, a reinstatement of a dividend and/or share repurchase plan might also be in the near term horizon as this has been a common capital allocation approach historically.

IND is not completely forgotten or unknown to established investors although it’s a nano-cap stock that is highly illiquid. Two investors that I deeply respect and follow closely are Peter Gyllenhammar (a well known Swedish investor who runs a private investment company called Peter Gyllenhammar AB) and Jeroen Bos (author of the book “Deep Value Investing: Finding Bargain Shares with Big Potential” and fund manager at Church House Deep Value Investment Fund). Both investors are on INDs list of major shareholders. Gyllenhammar bought his 4,26 % stake in IND as late as August and September 2018. Bos has a 3,8% stake in IND and based on the funds latest factsheet the company is the tenth largest holding with a portfolio weight of 4,6%. Having these two respectable investors on “my team” is always comforting.

There have recently been some changes in management. Most notably, the company got a new CEO in 2018 (Pedro Simoes). Although I don’t give much weight to the potential relationship between the CEO change and the profitability improvements, I think it’s a good sign that the company is has taken action to try to turn the ship around. What is maybe more interesting than the CEO change is the fact that insiders have been buying shares on the open market quite recently. However, on that note, one should know that only one director of IND owns more than 1% of the shares outstanding. So there is not that much skin in the game to talk about here.

Disclosure: The author is long IndigoVision Group PLC (LON:IND)

Cofidur SA (ALCOF)

Cofidur SA is a France based company that specializes in electronic sub-contracting services for sectors such as aviation technology and defense, multimedia and networks, transport, telecommunications and industry. The group’s activity is divided into a) equipping, assembling, and integrating electronic cards and b) design and manufacture of printed circuits. The company has been in business since the 1980s. Cofidur SA is listed in Paris (Alternext stock exchange) under the ticker ALCOF. Note that the company file their financial reports in French, so please be aware that there is a risk that I have misunderstood or overlooked something that might be of importance.

Background

ALCOF entered the Liquidation Oxymoron’s portfolio in November 2017 at an average price of 368 EUR. As I write this the shares are currently trading at a price of 286 EUR. Although the price has declined quite a bit I believe that the margin of safety has increased since I first entered the position. As will be evident below, ALCOF is a prime example of a Liquidation Oxymoron – a company that is worth more dead than alive (i.e. selling below liquidation value) although it’s are very much alive (i.e. it has solid going concern characteristics). Also, ALCOF has a few seeds of potential catalysts in place that could unlock current undervaluation. 

Margin of safety

1) Selling below liquidation value?

ALCOF is a nano-cap (11 MEUR market capitalization) company with shares that are highly illiquid and overlooked. At current levels, ALCOF is trading near historical lows and selling at one of the cheapest price-to-liquidation multiples that I know of. At the current share price of 286 EUR, the company is selling at a 0,5x multiple in relation to its net current asset value (NCAV) of 22 MEUR. Of the total amount of net current asset about 22% consists of cash and cash equivalents. The rest consists of about equal amounts of inventory and accounts receivables. Historically the NCAV has been growing steadily (i.e. positive NCAV burn-rate) mainly as a result of decreasing total liabilities (see more about this decrease in the comments on criteria 3 below).

There are some PP&E on ALCOFs balance sheet (3,8 MEUR) but nothing major to take into consideration for the calculation of liquidation value. The price-to-net-tangible-assets multiple is currently 0,4x. However, one should know that ALCOF sold one of their four factories (Cherbourg) last year for a price of 3,6 MEUR. A price well above the value on the books back then. As they own another site in Montpellier it’s not to far fetched to think there could be some hidden value on the books for that site as well.

2) Proven business model?

When a company sells at such a low multiple in relation to its liquidation value one would expect that profitability has been and continues to be a big concern for the company. That is not the case here as ALCOF has recorded positive net earnings for the last eight years while simultaneously generating good amounts of free cash flow. Also, retained earnings currently amount to 22 MEUR. Furthermore, the level of profitability has been more than just fine as ALCOF have continuously posted net profit margins in the range of 2-4% and ROIC in the range of 10-16% during the time period mentioned.

3) Sound financial position?

During the last eight years, shareholder equity has increased from 13 MEUR to 26 MEUR while the company’s total debt has simultaneously decreased from 18 MEUR to 4 MEUR. In other words, the financial position has not only been improved tremendously but is currently at a level that in absolute terms is to be considered very financially sound. Debt-to-equity has decreased from 1,3x to 0,1x. Final, a key ratio that also demonstrates the financial soundness of ALCOF is the Altman Z-score which is currently at 3,2. According to the formula, with a Z-score > 3 ALCOF is in the “safe zone” as it relates to the risk of bankruptcy.

4) Responsible management?

Added on top of the capital allocation decision to aggressively pay down its debt positions, ALCOF has also paid a dividend to shareholders for each year during the last ten years. The current dividend yield is 2,8%. The company has also made some share repurchases historically (about 10% of the shares outstanding during the last ten years) and there is currently an active share repurchase plan (active until 24 November 2019) in place for another 10% of the shares outstanding. One should here note that the share repurchase plan has a price buyback limit set at 400 EUR. Although the current share price is 286 EUR and the company is sitting on a big pile of cash, ALCOF has yet used the current share repurchase plan. In sum, although I think it’s fair to state that ALCOF’s management has not historically maximized shareholder value I also think it’s fair to state that management have neither been fraudulent nor have they been unthoughtful in their historical operational and capital allocation decisions.

Other factors and characteristics

ALCOF is not only cheap from an asset valuation perspective (i.e. trading well below liquidation value) but from an earnings power valuation perspective as well. For example, the company is currently trading at a P/E of 3x. However, one should note that ALCOF is not a clear mean-reversion-candidate, as low valuations (both in relation to assets and earnings) has been a recurring theme for the company historically.

During the last year, insiders have been selling shares on the open market (last time was in February 2019). On that note, one should know that a company called EMS Finance owns +50% of ALCOF. The majority ownership can be dated back to 2009 when EMS Finance tried to buy ALCOF but failed. The CEO of ALCOF (Henri Tanduc) is also the CEO of EMS Finance. On the shareholder list of EMS Finance, we also find other insiders of ALCOF. Insiders that have been selling ALCOF shares on the open market. I have yet to figure out why they have been selling their personal shares on the open market. Also, I have not found anything that would indicate that EMS Finance has simultaneously increased or decreased their position in ALCOF. Insiders selling on the open market is obviously a concern with the ALCOF idea going forward. However, as long as EMS Finance don’t decrease their position I will try not to read too much into it.

Disclosure: The author is long Cofidur SA (EPA:ALCOF).